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In law, interpretativism refers to a diverse family of theoretical approaches founded on the 
central category of meaning. It maintains that the phenomenon of law cannot adequately be 
grasped by imitating the methods of the natural sciences. Interpretativism covers such a broad 
range because law itself is widely recognized to be an interpretative practice. Given the 
potential range of inquiry, we offer a synthetic overview by distinguishing between three 
contemporary varieties of legal interpretativism: descriptivist, normativist, and 
phenomenological. Each postulates a particular conception of law and adopts a distinctive 
methodological framework. These three varieties are examined in the sections that follow and 
they are illustrated through analysis of the ideas of leading legal theorists working mainly 
within the Anglo-American tradition.  
 
We should begin, however, by differentiating between an interpretative legal theory and a 
theory of legal interpretation. The aim of a theory of legal interpretation is to explain how rules 
that form a legal system are deployed as justificatory reasons in particular judicial decisions; it 
reveals the method by which general rules are to be applied to individual cases. A theory of 
legal interpretation therefore seeks to explain how judges do, or should, resolve disputes about 
the meaning of the law. This type of theory must be distinguished from an interpretative legal 
theory. The latter type requires a more basic theoretical investigation since it is intended to 
offer an explanation of the nature and development of law as a complex social phenomenon. 
An interpretative legal theory acknowledges the intrinsically hermeneutical character of the 
human sciences (Taylor, 1985). 
 
This chapter examines the range of interpretative theories of public law. This too covers a 
broad range of theories because the category of public law is ambiguous. Jurists commonly 
draw a distinction between public law and private law, that is, between the law regulating 
relations between institutions of government or between government and its subjects on the 
one hand, and the law regulating relations between subjects on the other. The difficulty is that 
this distinction reduces public law merely to that of a subset of positive law. But this is a 
product of a philosophy of legal positivism and legal positivism is an aspect of naturalism that 
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interpretative theories aim to challenge. Consequently, instead of assuming that public law is a 
subset of positive law, interpretative theories of public law must begin by addressing a 
foundational question: rather than accepting the authority of the constitution as a 
presupposition of legal analysis, interpretative theories of public law are obliged to offer a 
juristic account of the constitution of public authority. This is a challenge that interpretative 
theories of public law ultimately cannot avoid. 
 
 
II: CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY 
 
Legal interpretation is a central element of legal argumentation and the development of a 
theory of legal interpretation has always been a critical part of the jurist’s theoretical apparatus 
(MacCormick 1978; Alexy 1989). An interpretative legal theory, by contrast, is a general theory 
of law which, rather than offering an account of the canons of legal interpretation, presents an 
explanatory account of the nature of law. With respect to public law, this distinction is most 
clearly expressed by drawing a distinction between a theory of constitutional interpretation and 
a theory of the constitution.  
 
This distinction is of primary importance. Historically, the tendency to conflate constitutional 
theory to the theory of constitutional adjudication has been bolstered by the predominance of 
a professional conception of legal education which conceives the main task of legal education 
as that of providing students with the techniques needed to become successful practitioners. 
This professional orientation also came to dominate public law scholarship, especially in the 
United Kingdom, where public lawyers avoided theoretical inquiry in favour of the production 
of textbooks, casebooks, and case-analyses (McAuslan 1978, Galligan, 1982). Although 
American constitutional scholarship has been more sophisticated in the range of its inquiry, 
historically it too has tended to equate constitutional theory with a theory of constitutional 
interpretation. The critical issue became that of the legitimacy of judicial review and, as a 
consequence, scholarly writing sought primarily to offer guidance to the Supreme Court on the 
correct interpretation of the US Constitution. Scholarly inquiry into constitutional ordering 
thus came to be equated with the development of cogent legal arguments to be made before an 
authoritative legal tribunal (Griffin 1989). 
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Within the boundaries of a professionally-prescribed view of the subject, public lawyers could 
only produce what might be called a ‘shallow’ sort of constitutional theory, that is, a theory 
which limited its ambition to that of presenting positive public law in a systematic fashion. The 
task became that of ordering the mass of legal texts and judicial decisions on a principled basis 
to expound the relevant legal materials as a coherent whole. Interpretative constitutional 
theory has a more ambitious objective, that of presenting an account of public law founded in 
a general theory of law and politics (see Brudner 2004, ch.1).  
 
While ‘shallow’ theories promote the coherent development of constitutional law and facilitate 
an on-going learned conversation amongst judges, lawyers and scholars, ‘deep’ theories are 
obliged to maintain a critical distance from practice and put into question the assumptions on 
which professional legal discourse is founded. Scholarly inquiry into the foundations of public 
law requires the incorporation of historical, sociological and philosophical insight into the 
exercise of understanding the manner in which public authority is established and maintained 
(Griffin 1989). Deep theories make use of cross-disciplinary methods of inquiry. The nature of 
their inquiry also comes to be framed by the type of questions that are more likely to engage 
the interest of social scientists. What precisely is a constitution? How does a constitution 
acquire its authority? To what extent does the constitution play the role of an integrating 
mechanism in society? What is the relationship between constitutional legality and 
constitutional legitimacy? Questions of this nature extend the range of inquiry and deepen its 
complexity.   
 
Although shallow constitutional theorizing remains the prevailing type in Anglo-American law 
schools, the more challenging type of inquiry represented by deep constitutional theory is 
becoming more prominent (see Tushnet 2004; Loughlin 2005). Deep constitutional theories 
can be elaborated following different methodological strategies, leading to the establishment of 
different conceptual frameworks; some are formulated from general normative theories of law 
and political morality (eg Dworkin; Allan), while others draw on the findings of empirically-
orientated political science and political history (eg Griffin 1996, 1999 in the USA; Jennings, 
Robson and Griffith in the UK – see Loughlin 2014 for overview). In this contribution only 
those that can be considered a variety of interpretative legal theory will be discussed. 
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III: DESCRIPTIVE INTERPRETATIVISM 
 
 
For those coming from other disciplines within the humanities and the social sciences, it may 
come as a surprise that twentieth century analytical legal positivism constitutes the point of 
departure of contemporary interpretative legal theory. The reason is that one finds the earliest 
statements of interpretative legal theory in the work of the two leading legal positivists of the 
last century, Hans Kelsen and HLA Hart. Each developed general theories of law in which, 
rather than taking the natural sciences as their methodological model, the category of meaning 
occupies a central place. 
 
III.1: The Pure Theory of Law 
 
In The Pure Theory of Law, first published in 1934, Hans Kelsen presented the first fully 
developed statement of a distinctive approach to law which he continued to develop and revise 
during a long career. His general objective was to produce a theory of scientific legal 
knowledge. He argued that this can be realized only when the theory both has law as its 
exclusive object - that it grasps the uniqueness of its object of enquiry -  and is scientific – that 
it is orientated exclusively to the cognition of law free from all ideology. Kelsen’s Pure Theory 
sought to determine the conditions that make possible such a system of legal knowledge.  
 
The pure theory requires two conditions to be met. First, that knowledge of the law must be 
strictly separated from all ideological questions, which for Kelsen means questions that pertain 
to politics and morality, but not science (Kelsen 1992, §§ 8-13). Secondly, it means that law 
must be acknowledged as a social phenomenon, which means that it can be grasped only from 
the perspective of the human sciences (§§ 7, 15, 16). Kelsen maintains that natural law theory 
and sociological theories of law both fail to develop a scientific understanding of law. Natural 
law theory fails because the transcendental notion of an absolute value that a moral theory of 
law supposes cannot be the object of scientific cognition. Sociological theory fails because, in 
treating legal acts as causally connected behavioural regularities rather than as social acts that 
carry specific normative meanings, it ignores the specific normative meaning of legal acts.  
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The reason why sociological theories fail to offer a scientific account of law is of a particular 
importance since it identifies the pure theory as an interpretive theory. Kelsen argues that the 
uniqueness of law as an object of enquiry is grasped only once it is appreciated that law is a 
phenomenon that can only be observed in society. This specifically legal dimension of a social 
event cannot be comprehended from the viewpoint of the natural sciences. Although legal 
phenomena are experienced as natural events that are perceptible through the senses (as 
decisions and actions), its legal dimension is understood only once its specific normative 
meaning is recognized. A material event constitutes a legal datum only to the extent that it can 
be interpreted as such according to a valid legal norm. In this sense, legal norms constitute a 
scheme of interpretation according to which the objective legal meaning of an act can be attributed. 
  
Kelsen noticed that if causation, which connects causes and effects, is the fundamental structure 
of explanation within the natural sciences, imputation, which links events interpreted as legal 
acts with their legal consequences, is the functional equivalent within legal science (§§ 2, 4, 5). 
Law therefore constitutes an autonomous realm of meaning and the challenge for the pure theory is 
to determine how it can be scientifically known in its specificity (§ 7). But why do certain acts 
have a legal meaning and others do not? Kelsen maintains that an act acquires a legal meaning 
by virtue of the existence of another ‘higher’ legal norm. And that norm similarly is valid only 
because a further ‘higher’ norm authorizes it. The difficulties arise when this chain of 
authorization runs out.  
 
Assume that a group assemble and vote on a certain proposition. Those actions do not in 
themselves make law. We recognize these events as law-making acts only by interpreting their 
meaning in a particular manner; that is, only by recognizing the existence of a higher norm that 
identifies that assembly as a legislature which is authorized to make laws. Where does this 
higher norm that confers legal validity on this act come from? The answer is that the norm is 
contained in the Constitution. But one must then ask: what makes the Constitution valid? 
Kelsen’s answer is that there comes a point in every legal order at which one must presuppose 
the validity of some basic norm. The basic norm, then, is a normative hypothetical 
presupposition: it is to be understood as the objective validity of the first act which originates 
the chain of validity (viz. the ordered series of legal acts) that granted normative authorization to 
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the norm-creating act that generates the norm used as a scheme of interpretation (§§ 16, 27-9). 
Kelsen contends that there is simply no alternative to this pre-supposition, because otherwise 
we offend against the Humean injunction of deriving an ‘ought’ from an ‘is’.  
 
III.2: Law as the union of primary and secondary rules 
 
The descriptive interpretative theory of law was further advanced by the publication in 1961 of 
HLA Hart’s The Concept of Law. Hart defined a legal order as comprising a union of primary 
and secondary rules, in which the primary rules impose duties and the secondary rules confer 
powers. We recognize primary rules as forming the sharp end of law; these impose obligations, 
such as an obligation not to dishonestly acquire another person’s goods. Secondary rules are 
more complex; they include the power of officials to execute the primary rules and to resolve 
disputes and of legislators to make new laws. Hart argued that there was a special secondary 
rule, called the rule of recognition; this rule is analogous to Kelsen’s basic norm in that it is the 
ultimate rule for conclusive identification of all other rules forming part of an existing legal 
order.  
 
But the idea animating Hart’s account was that in order to understand any social practice —
and, in particular, law— the observer must consider not simply the externally observable behaviour 
of actors but also the internal point of view of participants in the practice. Hart’s main insight was, 
more concretely, that in order to explain what is a (social) rule and what it means to affirm that 
a rule exists in a social group, one needs to consider not only whether most of its members 
share a certain pattern of conduct (the external aspect) but also whether they also adopt a critical 
reflective attitude towards the pattern of behaviour (the internal aspect), meaning that they 
accept it as a reason for acting and a reason justifying critical reaction towards deviant conduct 
(Hart 1994: 55-7, 82-99). 
 
Hart’s hermeneutic approach shows why normative language and normatively structured social 
practices cannot be explained by assuming the purely external point of view of an observer 
who only registers perceptible behavioural phenomena. It shows that law can be understood 
only once one recognizes the internal perspective of participants who take the law to be a 
binding normative system and for whom these rules operate as reasons for acting and judging 
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actions. Such recognition, Hart emphasizes, does not imply acceptance on the part of the 
observer; it requires no acceptance of the moral value or justice of that legal order (Hart 1994: 
102-5, 242). Hart too accepts Hume’s distinction: the task of descriptive (analytical) legal 
theory is to determine what the law is and it must be kept separate the normative (critical) 
theory of justice, of determining what the law ought to be (Hart 1983a; Hart 1983b). 
 
III.3: Positivism and Public Law 
 
The major advances in interpretative legal theory marked by Kelsen and Hart’s jurisprudence 
at the same time present significant challenges for interpretative theories of public law. Two 
features might be highlighted. The first is that these general theories of law make no distinction 
between public law and private law; a conventional distinction between the types of norms or 
rules of an extant legal order can obviously be drawn but for Kelsen and Hart they have no 
essential juristic relevance. The second is of greater significance. These are general theories of 
positive law and they treat public law only as a subset of that positive law. These positivist 
interpretative legal theories conceive the broader conception of public law – public law as the 
law constituting the authority of government – as a subject analogous to political sociology, 
and one that lies beyond the sphere of legal cognition.  
 
These shared limitations leave unanswered the central question of constitutional theory: what 
are the foundations of the authority of a politico-legal system? Kelsen discarded that question 
as a problem that could not be addressed by legal science. He therefore avoided altogether 
certain fundamental questions of public law: he buried the problematic of the constituent 
power under the fundamental hypothetical postulate of the basic norm, the problem of final 
jurisdictional decisions under the doctrine of the tacit alternative clause, and the problem of 
external sovereignty under a monistic theory of international public law (Kelsen 1992: §§28-
31). Similarly Hart converted all such questions into empirical problems relating to the 
determination of the fundamental criteria that higher officials use to identify the law in their 
decisions (Hart 1994: 102-110, 114-17). The austere methodological approach of descriptive 
interpretativist legal theories does not provide conceptual space for adequately addressing the 
central questions of constitutional theory.  
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Descriptive interpretativism has nevertheless had a significant impact on constitutional 
discourse, especially in the USA. It provides the intellectual grounding of an influential mode 
of constitutional interpretation which seeks to restore a science of interpretation by treating 
the constitutional text as the sole source of interpretative fidelity. This technique, sometimes 
called originalism (Bork 1985; Scalia 1997), has been labeled the ‘pure interpretive model’ 
(Grey, 1975) or ‘clause-bound interpretivism’ (Ely 1980, ch.1). It stands opposed to theories of 
constitutional interpretation that invite judges to treat the constitution as a ‘living document’ 
and to interpret the text liberally and in accordance with contemporary social norms that vary 
significantly from the world of the authors of that text. In this positivist argument, 
interpretativism is restricted to documentary exegesis, otherwise of written textualism. Many 
regard this as highly restrictive and ultimately self-defeating (eg Dworkin 1996-97). But its 
influence has been such that many of its adherents regard normative and phenomenological 
interpretativists – those theories addressed in the following sections – as ‘non-interpretivists’, 
in that they are either not interpreting the authoritative text or are interpreting some unwritten 
supplement, such as moral values of society (Grey 1975; Ely 1980). 
 
 
IV: NORMATIVE INTERPRETATIVISM 
 
 
IV.1: Law as argumentative social practice. 
 
The pathway to the second type of interpretative legal theory was opened by critical reactions 
to interpretative legal positivism. Of particular importance has been the work of the American 
legal theorist, Ronald Dworkin, who since the 1960s has developed a sustained assault of the 
underpinnings of analytical legal positivism. The distinctive traits of his approach derive from 
its commitment to an interpretative theory that rejects descriptivism. Dworkin argues that legal 
theory must be both normative and internal. Law cannot be understood without adopting 
normative positions about its justificatory values and it is internal in the sense that there can be 
no category distinction between philosophical and doctrinal discourse about law. The key lies 
in the realization that law is an argumentative social practice. That is, law is a social practice 
whose function, complexity and consequence depend on this crucial structural feature: in large 
 10 
part legal practice consists in participants making and debating claims about what the law 
requires. This is the ‘central, propositional aspect of legal practice’. In order to be able to 
explain the practice of law we need to understand what Dworkin calls ‘the grounds of law’, 
that which makes propositions of law true (Dworkin 1986: 14-15).  
 
Dworkin maintains that once this argumentative character of legal practice is given its central 
explanatory role, a fundamental feature of legal practice is revealed: that the truthfulness or 
soundness of propositions of law is sensitive to what participants take to be the scheme of 
principles or values that the law expresses. Law therefore constitutes an instance of what he 
called an interpretive practice, a shared tradition whose requirements are interpreted and applied 
in a way that is sensitive to what is taken to be its point. It follows that law is something that 
cannot be determined without taking a position on the values and principles it exists to serve. 
A strict distinction between explanation (what the law is) and justification (what the law ought 
to be) cannot therefore be drawn. Any theory of law that seeks to be explanatory must be, at 
least implicitly, normative (Dworkin 1986: 87-113). 
 
Law, then, is an argumentative practice that is ‘principle-embedded’, meaning that ‘we justify 
legal claims by showing that principles that support those claims also offer the best justification 
of more general legal practice in the doctrinal area in which the case arises’ (Dworkin 2006a: 
51-2). It is for this reason that ordinary legal discourse and legal theory are not independent 
universes of discourse; they differ only in the way they reason (inside-out v. outside-in) and the 
levels of abstraction (concrete and particular v. abstract and overarching). This intrinsic 
continuity becomes visible in the hard case because it is here that legal practice, which always 
focuses on what the law requires in particular disputes, is obliged to start the journey in search 
of the answer to the question of which interpretation is favoured by the principles that are 
served by the relevant branch of law, and which ultimately justify legal practice as whole. Hard 
cases force legal practice to embark on a theoretical ascent (Dworkin 2006a: 53-7), requiring 
practice and theory become so similar that ‘the difference can be defended, if at all, only as an 
elusive matter of degree’ (Dworkin 2006b: 79). This is why ‘jurisprudence is the general part of 






IV.2: The moral reading of the constitution 
 
Dworkin’s normative interpretativism suggests that legal theory should be understood as ‘a 
special part of political morality’, a sub-category of moral theory identified only by its distinct 
institutional structures (Dworkin 2006c: 34-5). This leads him to the moral reading of the 
Constitution: competing strategies of constitutional interpretation —and, thus, all existing 
large-scale patterns of judicial decisions in constitutional cases— involve the articulation of 
‘different understandings of central moral values embedded in the Constitution’s text’ 
(Dworkin 1996: 2). This moral reading is bolstered by an important feature shared by most 
contemporary political constitutions: a catalogue of basic rights that declares individual rights 
against the government in abstract moral language. The task of constitutional theory becomes 
that of restating at the most general possible level the central moral principles set out in the 
Bill of Rights in order to ‘make their force clearer to us, and to help us to apply them to more 
concrete political controversies’ (Dworkin 1996: 7). Contrary to the naïve views of originalism 
– descriptive textualism – judges should respect not only what the framers ‘intended to say’, 
but also have regard to the ‘structural design of the constitution as whole’ and the ‘dominant 
lines of past constitutional interpretation by other judges’ for the purpose of elaborating a 
coherent constitutional morality (Dworkin 1996: 10). 
 
In American debates, constitutional interpretation is closely linked to the issue of the 
legitimacy of judicial review in a democracy. For Dworkin, the variety of answers given to this 
question expresses different understandings of what is ‘democracy’s fundamental value or point’ 
(Dworkin 1996: 15). Contrary to majoritarian conceptions that claim that judicial review 
necessarily compromises democracy, Dworkin posits the constitutional conception.  
 
Democracy presupposes a collective decision in which a group of individuals not only act 
together as a function of what each individually determines (statistical collective action), but 
also as a community in which individual actions merge together to form a distinct type of 
collective agency (communal collective action), attributable to a collective entity called ‘the 
people’ (Dworkin 1996: 19-20). Democratic self-government also presupposes certain 
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conditions of membership of a political community that ‘makes it fair to treat him [the 
member]—and sensible that he treat himself— as responsible for what it does’ (Dworkin 1996: 
23). These democratic conditions of moral membership stipulate that a person can be counted as a 
member of a political community only if: (i) s/he is able to take part in collective decisions 
(through universal suffrage, effective elections and representation); (ii) his/her stake is 
acknowledged (i.e. the consequences of collective decisions on his life are given the same 
consideration as the consequences they have on others); and (iii) his/her moral independence 
is respected (i.e. while deferring to authoritative collective decisions, individuals should be able 
to form their own views on these matters and determine how to live their lives within the 
opportunities and resources that collective decisions leave to them) (Dworkin 1996: 24-6). 
 
The constitutional conception suggests that only governments subject to these conditions are 
democratic and that the defining aim of democracy is to ensure that collective decisions be 
made by political institutions that treat all their members with equal concern and respect 
(Dworkin 1996: 17). On this account, democracy demands the existence of representative 
institutions but it neither requires that all political decisions be taken by elected officers nor 
requires that legislative institutions have the final authority in all matters. The many moral 
dimensions of these democratic conditions suggest that in some cases majoritarian legislative 
decisions could erode the democratic character of the community. In such cases, a court that 
invalidates these decisions should not be deemed anti-democratic, as the majoritarian 
conception suggests; rather, the court’s action should be seen as enhancing democracy 
(Dworkin 1996: 32).  
 
Dworkin recognizes that this account does not amount to a positive argument for judicial 
review. By virtue of its account of the complex moral dimensions of democratic conditions, 
however, the constitutional conception is able to show two things: first, that the institution of 
judicial review does not necessarily compromise democracy and, secondly, that there can be no 
presupposition in favour of any one of the institutions established under democratic 
conditions. This suggests that democracy is ‘a procedurally incomplete scheme of government’ 
and therefore that democratic political communities may combine a variety of solutions to the 
articulation of the institutional structures involved in interpreting these democratic conditions 
(Dworkin 1996: 33). He argues further that, as applied to American constitutional practice, this 
 13 
constitutional conception leads to recognition that judges have final interpretative authority to 
explicate the Bill of Rights as a constitution of principle without needing to provide strained or 
distorted readings more congenial to the majoritarian conception (Dworkin 19962: 35). 
 
IV.3: Normativist constitutional jurisprudence 
 
This grasp of law as an interpretative practice has a relatively long lineage in American 
constitutional discourse. It origins can be traced to Cardozo’s claim that law is best understood 
as an exercise in ‘reasoned elaboration’ (Cardozo 1931). This was given more systematic 
expression in the 1960s, most prominently by Alexander Bickel. Bickel rejects the descriptivist 
account that judicial review is justified ‘from the constitutional text, from history, or from the 
record of their own … prior decisions’. These ‘deposits of experiences’ are merely ‘empirical 
aids’ to interpretation. In their search for answers to constitutional questions, Bickel argues, 
the judiciary must ‘immerse themselves in the tradition of our society … in history and in the 
sediment of history which is law, and … in the thought and the vision of the philosophers and 
the poets’ (Bickel 1962, 236). Bickel maintains that the constitutional role of the judiciary is to 
interpret the fundamental principles of a nation’s political morality. Dworkin’s work is 
significant, then, in offering the most philosophically rigorous account of this lineage of 
thought. This line of normative interpretativist inquiry has focused on the two major issues 
that have come to dominate American constitutional theory. Dworkin’s moral reading is thus 
intended to answer the question of how the Constitution should be interpreted, and his 
constitutional conception of democracy seeks to resolve the question of how judicial review is 
justified. 
 
Notwithstanding the American tone and object, Dworkin’s legal and constitutional theory has 
inspired the development of normativist revisionary interpretations of the British constitution. 
Foremost among these is the work of TRS Allan who ‘defend[s] an interpretative approach to 
law that seeks to show, not merely what the law requires or permits, on correct analysis, but 
why that reading of the law is morally justified—consistent with basic political values that we 
can affirm as proper guides to the practice of liberal democracy’ (Allan 2013, 20). Allan argues 
that it is only by adopting ‘the internal approach appropriate to an interpretation of law—an 
interpretation of the British constitution respectful of the value of individual freedom’ that ‘we 
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can perceive the right way to reconcile’ the ‘superficially conflicting principles’ of parliamentary 
sovereignty and the rule of law (Allan 2013, 32). 
 
Allan deploys a method of constitutional interpretation that is ‘broadly consistent with Ronald 
Dworkin’s influential account’, especially with respect to the ‘interplay of fact and value, 
uniting historical inheritance and moral judgement’ (Allan 2013, 340). In developing this 
account, he highlights in particular the limitations of Hart’s descriptive interpretativism, 
arguing that the ‘ought’ that is a feature of the internal aspect of rules is necessarily a moral 
‘ought’. Allan maintains that once we recognize ‘the rule of law’ as the fundamental ideal, ‘our 
concept of law is closely linked to our ideas about justice and freedom’ and ‘Hart’s legal 
positivism is hard to sustain’ (Allan 2013, 44). 
 
 
V: PHENOMENOLOGICAL INTERPRETATIVISM 
 
V.1: Critique of descriptive and normative interpretativism 
 
Descriptive interpretativism presents itself as a theory of positive law: law, it is claimed, should 
not be confused with issues of social justice and morality since this is to confuse description 
and evaluation. It is able to present law as science only by pre-supposing in legal thinking a 
basic authorizing norm. The question of authority – the question: why should one obey? - is 
therefore removed from legal cognition. Since the source of authority of any constitutional 
order must remain a central question for constitutional theory – public law in its broader 
conception – descriptive interpretativism is revealed as an inadequate explanatory framework 
for public law.  
 
Normative interpretativism builds on the ‘internal aspect’ of rule ordering highlighted in 
descriptive interpretativism to reveal law as a ‘forum of principle’ concerned to elaborate the 
moral justification of legal authority. It addresses the question of authority but it treats that 
question – and public law in its broader conception – as a matter of moral reasoning. Although 
the third type – phenomenological interpretativism – accepts that critical morality is an aspect 
of the inquiry, it maintains that normativism privileges an ideal image of ‘the rule of law’ 
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derived from universal moral axioms. This is said to skew understanding of the character of 
public law. If a political philosophy seeks an ideal theory of justice and constitutional theory 
offers a theory of an actually existing constitution, the phenomenological critique is that 
normativism converts an immanent exercise into a transcendental one. Rather than 
interpreting the practices of actually-existing regimes, normativism constructs ‘the moral 
sovereignty of the community of rational beings’ (Hunter 2001, 366). 
 
Phenomenological interpretativism, by contrast, seeks to discern ‘the autonomous working of a 
public reason in principles already lying before us in the mundane practice of constitutional 
jurisprudence’ (Brudner 2004, 11). Its essential features ‘are sifted from pre-existing material 
through an autonomous conception of public reason given a considerate justification and 
distinguishing what is ephemeral in constitutional law from what is rationally enduring’ 
(Brudner 2004, 11). It is an exercise in excavation rather than rational construction. It is 
therefore an exercise in ‘political justice’ in the sense that it considers ‘justice in the exercise of 
coercive power by those who claim a right to rule over comprehensive human associations—
that is, over human associations sufficient for all human needs (however these may be 
understood)’ (Brudner 2004: 12).  
 
V.2 Phenomenological method 
 
Phenomenological interpretativism begins with the recognition that humans are historically-
situated beings. We engage in critical reflection but cannot remove ourselves from history. The 
resulting tension between belonging and critical distance involves, in Gadamer’s language, ‘the 
fusion of horizons’, a concept suggesting the play of difference between one’s own and the 
alien, or between actuality and ideal (Gadamer 1989, 300-379). The implications for 
constitutional understanding come to the fore once the issue of state formation is brought into 
consideration. As sketched by such political philosophers as Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau, this 
type of inquiry into the foundations of the state involves an exercise in imagination. In each of 
their imaginative schemes, the passage to the civil state is envisaged as establishing a law-
governed constitutional regime founded on the consent of an equal citizenry. There is 
evidently a considerable degree of mystification in the presentation of such abstract schemes, 
especially when such schemes are invoked for the purpose of bolstering the authority of 
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existing governing regimes. Nevertheless, it is recognized that only by bringing this tension 
between actualization and critical reflection to consciousness can the character of 
constitutional discourse properly be grasped. 
 
The central insight of phenomenological interpretativism is derived from this unfolding 
tension between critical reflection and actuality. This can be expressed in many ways: between 
sovereignty and the sovereign, between state and government, between reason and will, 
between norm and decision, between text and life (Ricoeur, 1965). Phenomenological 
interpretation evolves through acknowledgment that the pact establishing equal citizenship 
also establishes a governing hierarchy; the task of determining the general will must, of 
necessity, be entrusted to the agencies of government. Public law – the law relating to the 
establishment and maintenance of the authority of government – is obliged to mediate 
between these registers.  
 
According to this phenomenological interpretation, constitutional narratives organize and 
clarify an unfolding experience relating to the activity of governing. Events acquire significance 
only by being drawn into a narrative scheme. This suggests that intelligibility, the ability to 
mould events into a constitutional narrative, is the key criterion. The significance of this type 
of interpretative exercise can be highlighted by distinguishing it from descriptive and 
normative modes of interpretation. 
 
Phenomenological interpretativism treats modes of constitutional understanding that fall under 
the category of originalism as fundamentally misconceived. It suggests that the intention of 
those who drafted the constitutional document permits of no direct and immediate 
understanding; there is no alternative to mediation. Further, the precise language used in 
drafting the constitution is not simply speech; it is also an act. It becomes text, the condition of 
discourse, only by freeing itself from the immediate situation of its creation, thereby making 
itself available for interpretation. That is, it does its work not only through ‘internal’ dynamics 
– having regard to the political circumstances of the document’s production, the intentions of 
its drafter, and its reception by the original audience – but also by ‘external’ projection.  
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Ricoeur explains that the task of hermeneutics is to reconstruct this twofold undertaking, by 
looking back on ‘the first presupposition, that of philosophy as reflexivity, by way of the 
second, philosophy as phenomenology, right up to the third, that of mediation first by signs, 
then by symbols and, finally, by texts’ (Ricoeur 1991, 18). The objective of constitutional 
discourse is not to discover some original intent in the words of the document but to grasp 
‘the dynamic of the text and to restore to the work its ability to project itself outside itself in a 
representation of a world’ we could inhabit (Ricoeur 1991, 18). 
 
V.3 Public law as political discourse 
 
It is evident that this phenomenological approach rejects originalism as a technique of 
constitutional interpretation on the ground that it is founded on a positivist illusion of textual 
objectivity. But this approach also differentiates itself from normativism. It does so on three 
main grounds, which can most concisely be labelled monism, moralism and legalism. Each 
ground will be explained in turn. 
 
While normativists treat interpretation as an exercise in the law ‘making itself pure’, a purity 
that exposes its liberal virtues (Dworkin, 1986), phenomenologists recognize that the exercise 
of promoting narrative coherence will invariably lead to the generation of a variety of 
competing schemes of interpretation. One prominent example is to be found in the work of 
Cass Sunstein, who argues that the search for some neutral reading of the constitution is an 
impossible dream. Since the exercise is shot through with value judgments, there can be no 
‘right answer’. Sunstein illustrates this general claim by arguing that the dominant mode of 
interpretation of the US Constitution today is highly partial; notwithstanding its republican 
origins, the prevailing interpretation is influenced by the values of classical liberalism (Sunstein 
1993). 
 
This liberal bias, generated by a search for one true interpretation, is closely linked to the 
second critique, that of moralism. If within any constitutional regime there exists a variety of 
conflicting narrative schemes, the criticism of normativism is that it skews our understanding 
of legal interpretation by maintaining that it is a form of moral reasoning. Phenomenologists, 
by contrast, maintain that, faced with a variety of plausible competing schemes, authoritative 
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constitutional decisions are reached through the emergence of a pragmatic overlapping 
consensus produced in the context of ‘incompletely theorized agreements’ (Sunstein 1998). 
Alternatively expressed, it is claimed that constitutional decision-making is prudentially 
managed and negotiated (Loughlin 2003: 131-52). Rather than involving the search for what is 
morally right, the exercise of constitutional jurisdiction entails pragmatic and prudential 
accommodations determined by the need to maintain political authority (Posner 1998).  
 
The underlying monism and moralism of normative interpretativism is bolstered by its 
constitutional legalism. Normativists invariably assume that the constitution’s meaning is 
authoritatively determined by an established institution, that of a supreme court. From a 
phenomenological perspective, the assumption that lawyers and judges possess a special insight 
into the meaning of a state’s constitution is placed in question. This type of argument has 
undergone a recent revival in American constitutional discourse, with scholars arguing that the 
earlier meaning of ‘fundamental law’ as a special type of law that bound ‘morally and politically, 
not legally’ should be restored (Snowiss 1990: 42), that each of the three main institutions of 
state has an equal authority to determine its own rights and duties under the constitution 
(Kramer 2004: 106), and that, far from being a monopoly of lawyers, the original sense of the 
constitution as an arrangement that evolves through an active citizenry and as the product of 
broad public deliberation should be rekindled (Tushnet 1999). 
 
In challenging the intrinsic monism, moralism and legalism underpinning normative 
interpretativism, the phenomenological approach suggests that our starting point must be to 
treat public law as a distinctive type of political discourse (Loughlin 1992: 4; 2003: ch.3). 
Phenomenological interpretativism takes form as a commitment to the idea that, at base, 
public law involves the attempt to grasp the meaning of an extensive range of governmental 
practices and that neither the observation of political behaviour nor the study of ordinary legal 
materials is in itself sufficient. Understanding requires an expansion of the range of inquiry 
beyond the formal materials of positive public law by unveiling that which is implicit in them, 
opening up ‘a range of important issues for examination and encourag[ing] us to render 
explicit, systematic and rigorous what in legal writing and legal practice is often implicit and 
based on intuition or “common sense”.’ (Loughlin 1992: 57). 
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One prominent illustration of this type of inquiry is found in Ackerman’s study of American 
constitutional development. Ackerman contends that ‘the basic unit of analysis should be the 
constitutional regime, the matrix of relationships and fundamental values that are usually taken as 
the constitutional baselines in normal political life’ (Ackerman 1991: 59). Through this 
relational method, which ‘builds bridges to the political scientists, historians, and philosophers 
with whom lawyers should be collaborating’ in seeking to understand constitutional 
development (ibid. 59), he conceives the Constitution as ‘an evolving historical practice’ (ibid. 
35). Ackerman’s objective is to use this cross-disciplinary approach drawn from the regime 
perspective to show ‘concretely how it provides new resources for the resolution of classic 
problems of legal doctrine’ (ibid. 60). Using such interpretative methods, Ackerman is able to 
demonstrate how the US Constitution has been transformed at certain critical periods, which 
he calls ‘constitutional moments’, in ways that are not adequately explained by, or reflected in, 
the legal edifice of the written constitution and its judicial interpretation.  
 
Ackerman’s account of ‘constitutional moments’ has been subject to various criticisms (Griffin 
2007; Loughlin 2010: 303-5). Nevertheless, by extending the scope of constitutional analysis 
from formal legal materials to the constellation of rules, practices, institutions and ideas that 
help shape a distinctive identity, he provides a powerful illustration of the type of interpretative 
analysis that can be undertaken from a phenomenological perspective. 
 
Phenomenological interpretativism thus maintains that public law constitutes an essentially 
political practice whose complexity, structure and function derives from the ambiguous and 
contentious character of the activity of governing under modern constitutional arrangements 
ridden by the dialectical interaction between popular sovereignty and individual rights, 
democracy and rule of law, constituent power and ordinary politics, right and command, norm 
and exception, higher law and ordinary statute, legislation and administration, law-making and 
adjudication, and so on. The moralized views of public law practice and theory proposed by 
normative interpretativist theories underrate the crucial fact that the practice of modern public 
law is marked by a gulf between norm and fact, and that the contested constitutional 
articulation of the activity of governing continuously generates conflicts that cannot adequately 
be resolved by notions of ‘fit’ and ‘justification’. Consequently, public law discourse is best 
grasped by studying the competing self-understandings – traditions or ‘styles of thought’ 
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(Loughlin 1992) – that have emerged and which present contrasting accounts of the contours 
and boundaries of the subject and assign different meanings to the concepts that structure the 
practices of government –sovereignty, liberty, rights, democracy, and so on – whose origins are 





This overview of interpretative theories of public law leads to three general conclusions. First, 
that notwithstanding evident differences, the varieties of interpretative legal theories examined 
in this chapter share one basic insight: that law is a social phenomenon which cannot be 
adequately grasped by use of the explanatory frameworks characteristic of the natural sciences. 
All interpretative theories of law conceive the exercise as a hermeneutic undertaking. Secondly, 
that the movement from descriptivism to normativism and then to phenomenological 
interpretativism reflects a significant trend in contemporary public law thought. It marks, in 
particular, the transition from interpretation within a professionally-prescribed frame towards 
more all-encompassing conceptions that exhibit distanciation from the discursive forms of 
lawyers and judges and to locate law more explicitly within the domain of the political.  The 
third is that this trend also exhibits differences over whether public law is conceived as a sub-
category of positive law or whether a more ambitious enquiry into meaning is undertaken and 
the relation between legality and legitimacy examined.  
 
Debates in public law today are primarily polarized between normativist and 
phenomenological interpretations of the discipline. These debates are acquiring an additional 
layer of complexity as we move into a world in which a greater degree of governmental action 
is taking place through institutional arrangements that lie beyond the frameworks of nation-
states (Grimm 2005; Dobner and Loughlin eds 2010; Walker 2014). It is being reconfigured as 
a debate between cosmopolitans and statists (see, eg, Habermas 2001 v Grimm 1995). It 
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